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The absence of the doctrine of fair use from Australian copyright law has been 
a bone of contention in Australia after the Australia-United States Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA).  As the Australian government reformed the Copyright Act 
1968 (Cth) in the aftermath of the FTA it eschewed the option of adopting fair 
use. Instead, Australia chose to incorporate a version of fair use into its 
existing fair dealing framework. Accordingly, the Copyright Amendment Act 
2006 (Cth) inserted ss 41A and 103AA into the Copyright Act. These 
provisions provide that a fair dealing with a copyright protected work does 
not constitute an infringement if it is done for the purposes of parody or 
satire. These provisions codify part of the ratio of the United States Supreme 
Court in the seminal case of Campbell v Acuff Rose Music. However, the 
parameters of these new provisions are unexplored and the sparse nature of 
fair dealing jurisprudence means that the true meaning of the provisions is 
unclear. Moreover, two cases from the United States, SunTrust Bank v 
Houghton Mifflin and Salinger v Colting, underline just how important it is to 
have legal rules that protect literary ‘re-writes’. Both cases involved authors 
using an original novel to ‘write back’ to the original author and the broader 
culture. ‘Writing back’ or the ‘re-write’ has a firm basis in literature. It adds 
something invaluable to our culture. The key question is whether our legal 
landscape can allow it to flourish. This paper examines the interaction 
between fair use and literary re-writes. 
I INTRODUCTION 
Much has been made of the absence in Australian law of the United States’ fair 
use doctrine.1 However, the fair use doctrine is far from the complete panacea 
that its advocates contend. In the United States fair use could not save Frederick 
Colting’s novel 60 Years Later (60YL) from the claim that it infringed 
* BA, LLB (ANU), M Com (USYD), LLM Cornell; Lecturer, School of Law, Deakin University. 
1 In 2005 in response to stakeholder pressure the Commonwealth government instituted the Fair 
Use Inquiry. See Attorney-General’s Department, ‘Fair Use and Other Copyright Exceptions: 
An Examination of Fair Use, Fair Dealing and Other Exceptions in the Digital Age’ (Issues 
Paper, 5 May 2005). The result of that inquiry brought about the amendments to the Copyright 
Act 1968 (Cth) contained in the Copyright Amendment Act 2006 (Cth). More recently the 
Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) has again mooted the notion of including fair use 
in Australian copyright law. See ALRC, Copyright and the Digital Economy, Issues Paper No 
42 (2012) 71–9. 
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JD Salinger’s Catcher in the Rye.2 Similarly, even though Houghton Mifflin 
succeeded in having the 11th Circuit lift the injunction against publishing Alice 
Randall’s The Wind Done Gone (TWDG) it was far from clear that fair use 
would protect the novel from the contention that it infringed Gone With The 
Wind (GWTW). Yet, both Randall and Colting’s works embody a literary 
tradition of ‘writing back’ to power and to society. Randall’s novel exposed the 
racism that lay at the heart of GWTW by retelling the original novel from the 
perspective of a slave. Colting’s novel explored the themes of fame and 
reclusiveness by engineering a fictitious meeting between Salinger and his 
creation Holden Caulfield. These are the types of works that a flourishing 
culture would want to protect from claims of copyright infringement.  
In SunTrust Bank v Houghton Mifflin3 the 11th Circuit found that Randall’s 
novel TWDG was sufficiently transformative to warrant fair use protection.4 In 
making its decision the 11th Circuit drew upon the landmark Supreme Court 
decision of Campbell v Acuff-Rose5 in which the Supreme Court found that 2-
Live Crew’s version of Roy Orbison’s Oh, Pretty Woman was a parody that was 
a transformative fair use of the latter’s copyright protected work. In making this 
decision the Supreme Court put forward transformative use and parody as the 
key concepts that would create legal space for novels like TWDG and Colting’s 
60YL. Indeed, were it not for the Supreme Court’s decision in Campbell, 
Houghton Mifflin might not have decided to publish TWDG. In turn were it not 
for both Campbell and the 11th Circuit’s decision in SunTrust, Colting might not 
have decided to write 60YL or it might not have been published. Fair use sets 
out the legal infrastructure that allows for creative and commercial decisions. In 
turn this makes our culture richer by providing us with more cultural products 
from which to choose.  
This paper deals with the fair use and the idea of the novel as social 
commentary. It begins from the premise that certain types of novels will need to 
copy or borrow from other literary traditions or works in order to make their 
point.6 This can be done through novels that are either parodies or satires. The 
difference between parody and satire has been a controversial issue in the 
United States. However, while fair use has made a distinction between satire 
and parody,7 Australia has not seen fit to make that distinction.8 Similarly, I feel 
2 Salinger v Colting 641 F Supp 2d 250 (SDNY, 2009); Salinger v Colting 607 F 3d (2nd Cir, 
2010).  
3 268 F 3d 1257 (11th Cir, 2001). 
4 Ibid.  
5 510 US 569 (1994) (‘Campbell’). 
6 Campbell, 510 US 569, 580–1 (1994). 
7 See Campbell, 510 US 569, 580 (1994). Also, Walt Disney Productions v The Air Pirates, 581 F 
2d 751 (9th Cir, 1978) where the 9th Circuit held that the existence of satirical elements within an 
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that the distinction between satire and parody is unhelpful in this context. All 
too often art blurs the line between satire and parody and there is something 
artificial about law’s attempts to maintain the divide.9  In Campbell, Souter J 
elucidated the difference between satire and parody: 
Parody needs to mimic an original to make its point, and so has some claim to 
use the creation of its victim’s (or collective victims’) imagination, whereas 
satire can stand on its own two feet and so requires justification for the very 
act of borrowing.10 
While that is a neat statement of the difference between satire and parody in the 
context of copyright law, in practice it has proved much harder to maintain the 
distinction. For example, Randall’s novel TWDG, which was protected as fair 
use by the 11th Circuit, both parodies Mitchell’s novel and satirises the South.11 
That said, in fair use cases parodies have been protected even where they 
contained elements of criticism directed at the broader society, which sat quite 
outside any parody of the ‘target’ work.12 While there appears to be little 
difficulty in constructing a legal rule such that a derivative work may be a fair 
use even though it contains elements of satire whereas a pure satire cannot be a 
fair use, such a rule presumes that a bright line can be drawn between a parody 
and a satire. If that presumption does not hold true then the efficacy of the rule 
falters. 
impugned work would not prevent it from being a fair use parody. The Court stated at 758: 
‘[W]e do not regard it as fatal … that the “Air Pirates” were parodying life and society in 
addition to parodying the Disney characters. Such an effect is almost an inherent aspect of any 
parody. To the extent that the Disney characters are not also an object of the parody, however, 
the need to conjure them up would be reduced if not eliminated.’ In Elsmere Music Inc v 
National Broadcasting Co, 482 F Supp 741 (SD NY, 1980) the District Court held that both a 
satire and/or a parody could be fair use. However, in MCA Inc v Wilson, 677 F 2d 180 (2nd Cir, 
1981) the Court reaffirmed the position in Walt Disney. That is, a parody is a fair use and that 
provided that it takes aim at the original copyright protected work it will remain so even if it also 
makes broader points about society.  See also Leibovitz v Paramount Pictures Co 137 F 3d 109 
(2nd Cir, 1998); Dr Seuss Enterprises v Penguin Books USA Inc 109 F3d 1394 (9th Cir, 1997) 
(‘Dr Suess’).  
8 See Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 41A, 103AA.  
9 See Maree Sainsbury, ‘Parody, Satire and Copyright Infringement: The Latest Addition to 
Australian Fair Dealing Law’ (2007) 12 Media and Arts Law Review 292. See also Anna Spies, 
‘Revering Irreverence: A Fair Dealing Exception for both Weapon and Target Parodies’ (2011) 
34 University of New South Wales Law Journal 1122, 1124. 
10 Campbell, 510 US 569, 580–1 (1994). 
11 This is not in itself fatal under fair use. See the discussion above n 7 regarding Walt Disney and 
MCA Inc v Wilson.  
12 See above n 7.  
                                                                                                                       
428 DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 17 NO 2 
 
Moreover, fair use in the United States is underpinned by the First 
Amendment.13  As has been noted by the Supreme Court in Harper & Row 
Publishers Inc v Nation Enterprises14 and Eldred v Ashcroft (Attorney-
General),15 fair use is one of copyright’s internal safety valves that helps 
maintain the balance between copyright law and the First Amendment in the 
United States.16 The linkage between fair use parodies and the free speech 
values of the First Amendment has been noted in American jurisprudence. In Dr 
Seuss, the 9th Circuit stated: 
Parody is regarded as a form of social and literary criticism, having a socially 
significant value as free speech under the First Amendment.17 
Similarly, the 11th Circuit drew on the First Amendment in finding Randall’s 
novel a fair use parody.18 Notably, the 11th Circuit in SunTrust referred to ‘the 
shared principles of the First Amendment and copyright law’.19 Nevertheless, 
there does not seem to be any compelling reason to confine social criticism, or 
free speech generally, to parodies of specific works. If free speech is a powerful 
consideration in this context then restraining copyright protection in order to 
allow a social criticism that uses a particular work to make a broader point about 
society seems highly consonant with the notion of free speech and the debates 
that have long surrounded the First Amendment.  
It is perhaps quite fortunate that Australia has sidestepped this somewhat 
counterproductive argument over parody and satire in copyright law.20 After all, 
13 United States Constitution amend I. 
14 471 US 539 (1985) (‘Harper & Row’). While Harper & Row is certainly an appropriate 
precedent for the proposition that fair use is an internal safety valve for the First Amendment, 
the case is still troubling from a free speech perspective. Harper & Row represented the high 
water mark of the market failure theory of fair use. See Neil Netanel, ‘Locating Copyright 
within the First Amendment Skein’ (2001) 54 Stanford Law Review 1, 21. Netanel said ‘like the 
idea/expression dichotomy, fair use’s protection of First Amendment interests has weakened 
markedly in recent decades. The watershed in fair uses’s debilitation came in … Harper & Row 
Publishers, Inc v Nation Enterprises’. Netanel points to the obiter remarks in Harper & Row that 
draw upon Wendy Gordon’s article ‘Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic 
Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors’ (1982) 82 Columbia Law Review 1600.  
15 537 US 186 (2003). Ginsburg J, delivering the opinion of the Court, stated at 220 citing both 
Harper & Row and Campbell: ‘The fair use defense affords considerable “latitude for 
scholarship and comment” … and even for parody.’ (Citations omitted).  
16 Melville Nimmer, ‘Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech 
and Press?’ (1970) 17 University of California Los Angeles Law Review 1180. 
17 Dr Seuss, 109 F 3d 1394 (9th Cir, 1997). 
18 SunTrust, 268 F 3d 1257, 1277 (11th Cir, 2001). 
19 Ibid (emphasis added).  
20 This is particularly true if we add free speech as a consideration that weighs in favour of fair 
use in the case of parodic novels. Australian law has nothing akin to the First Amendment, other 
than the implied freedom of political communication contained in the Australian Constitution 
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the task of deciding whether a putative infringement of copyright in the case of 
a satirical novel is either fair use or a fair dealing is nothing more complex than 
an exercise in proportionality. That is, it involves balancing one legal interest 
(copyright protection) against another (free use of that copyright for public 
benefit) and deciding which must be afforded priority over the other as justice 
and established legal principles require.21 This is a familiar legal task and it is 
difficult to locate within that any great need to identify whether the potentially 
infringing work takes aims at the original work, society in general, or both. 
What must be accepted then is that both parody and satire are exercises in free 
speech and the fact that they warrant a free use exception in copyright law 
suggests that the statutory monopoly that is copyright needs to be reconciled 
with democratic values.22  
On a literary level this fits into a tradition of ‘writing back’ which in recent 
times has become rather pronounced in post-colonial literature and in the non-
commercial world of fan fiction. For example, Jean Rhys’ Wide Sargasso Sea 
was written as a prequel to Jane Eyre. Other obvious candidates in post-colonial 
literature for writing back are Vikram Seth’s A Suitable Boy which draws on the 
works of Jane Austen and Salman Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children which takes 
elements from Charles Dickens’ Great Expectations. Both of these works 
borrowed from earlier works which were out of copyright. While their takings 
may have been slender enough to warrant protection under fair use or fair 
dealing, they have engaged in the same form of writing back, albeit less directly, 
as Randall and Colting. Outside of post-colonial literature, Peter Carey wrote 
Jack Maggs, ostensibly telling the tale of Magwitch in Australia. Similarly, 
Tom Stoppard’s play Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are Dead portrayed Hamlet 
from the perspective of two minor characters.  
ss 7, 24. Indeed, Australia were to import fair use into its law there is an argument that it will 
lose something in translation in the absence of the First Amendment. At any rate, in the Second 
Reading Speech to the Copyright Amendment Act 2006 the then Attorney-General Philip 
Ruddock MP drew upon free speech in enacting ss 41A and 103AA of the Copyright Act: ‘A 
further exception promotes free speech and Australia’s fine tradition of satire by allowing our 
comedians and cartoonists to use copyright material for the purposes of parody or satire.’ See 
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 19 October 2006, 1-2 
(Philip Ruddock, Attorney-General). Little has been made of the Attorney-General’s reference 
to comedians and cartoonists and it is presumably an irrelevance. It is not suggested here that the 
exception is confined to comedy or cartoons. It is likely a reference to the Panel case, TCN 
Channel Nine Pty Ltd v Network Ten Pty Ltd [2002] FCAFC 146, in which the Channel Ten 
television show The Panel used copyright protected excerpts from Channel Nine as part of their 
comedic program.  
21 For a discussion of proportionality see Justice Kiefel, ‘Proportionality — a Rule of Reason’ 
(2012) 23 Public Law Review 85.  
22 Sir Anthony Mason has recognised that copyright may imperil free speech if its boundaries 
extend too far. See Sir Anthony Mason, ‘Public-Interest Objectives and the Law of Copyright’ 
(1998) 9 Journal of Law and Information Science 7, 11. 
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This paper examines fair use, literary re-writes and the broader legal policy 
question of whether to create a legal rule to allow works like those of Randall 
and Colting to survive claims of infringement. In particular, with the ALRC 
now considering adding both transformative uses and fair use into Australian 
copyright law23 it is pertinent to examine the legal issues surrounding SunTrust 
and Salinger v Colting. It might well be that where satirical or parodic novels 
are concerned, fair use is the least unattractive option. While it might not deliver 
the certainty that stakeholders desire, it does have the potential to provide a free 
use space for parodies.24 If the ALRC does recommend that Australian 
copyright law imports fair use into the Copyright Act then the American 
jurisprudence will be more relevant than ever before in determining the scope 
and shape of Australia’s copyright exceptions.  
At the outset of this paper it should be acknowledged that there are other 
dimensions to the policy problem of accommodating literary re-writes. First, 
these works are derivative works and the question of compensation for the 
original author is a legitimate consideration.25 There is a colourable argument 
that at the very least they should not be subjected to a legal regime that is so 
binary that it offers only the choice of infringement and suppression or complete 
freedom from copyright infringement. However, it is beyond the scope of this 
paper to consider questions of compulsory licensing and alternative 
compensation schemes. Secondly, this paper will not explore the boundaries of 
ss 41A and 103AA of the Copyright Act. In terms of black letter law this paper 
will confine itself to fair use.  
II AN ARGUMENT FOR SATIRE 
Legal policy is a complex art,26 and policy development in copyright law is 
peculiarly so. The legislature must contend not just with different stakeholders, 
but with new problems created by new technologies and international legal 
23 ALRC, above n 1, 36–40, 71–9. 
24 There are some interesting legal issues that will arise here should Australia import fair use. As 
noted above, the Supreme Court in Campbell, 510 US 569 (1994) distinguished between parody 
and satire. The Court held that parody could be protected under fair use whereas satire could not. 
This would need to be reconciled with Australia’s fair dealing provisions which refer to parody 
or satire as potential fair dealings.  
25 For example, an attempt to ‘re-write’ Nabakov’s Lolita from the perspective of the ill-fated 
heroine resulted in a copyright suit which was resolved by a settlement between the original 
author’s estate and the second author. See Michiko Kakutani, ‘“Lo’s Diary”: Humbert Would 
Swear this isn’t the Same Lolita’, New York Times (New York), 29 October 1999 
<http://www.nytimes.com/books/99/10/24/daily/102999pera-book-review.html>. 
26 Louis Mayo and Ernest Jones, ‘Legal Policy Decision Process: Alternative Thinking and the 
Predictive Function’ (1965) 33 George Washington Law Review 318.  
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rules.27 It requires the balancing of competing principles and priorities. This is 
not a task that can easily be managed. Often two or more principles will stand in 
conflict with each other. This conflict can emerge from the different 
perspectives and aspirations of different stakeholders in a given area of policy. 
It might arise from the legal subject matter itself, wherein long-established legal 
rules may clash with emerging legal norms. Some form of resolution will be 
required before any legal policy idea can properly be developed and advanced.  
There can be little doubt that copyright law has been an area of deep contention 
over the past two decades.28 From peer-to-peer infringement, anti-
circumvention laws, copyright duration and enforcement matters, copyright law 
has been a fertile ground for debate.29 This is no less the case where free speech, 
satire, author’s rights and fair dealing are concerned.30 There are a number of 
competing ideas that clamour for attention on this topic. It is helpful to unpack 
these ideas and to develop a basic policy idea that can underpin the forthcoming 
analysis of fair use and fair dealing.  
The logical starting point in any analysis of copyright law and policy is theory. 
What follows here is a potted version of the theoretical debates that have 
accompanied recent policy debates over copyright law. The point that I am 
driving at below is that (1) if copyright is a statutory monopoly conceived and 
proffered on a utilitarian basis (2) within a liberal democracy in which free 
speech is a quixotic if not an essential element in maintaining the health of that 
democracy, then the former should accede to the latter whenever the two come 
greatly into conflict. That is not to say that free speech should override 
copyright at all times. Were that to happen then free speech would ‘gut’ 
27 As Gleeson CJ, Hayne, Gummow and Heydon JJ noted in Stevens v Kabushiki Kaisha Sony 
Computer Entertainment (2005) 221 ALR 448, 449 [1]: ‘Over a long period amendments to 
copyright law have comprised legislative solutions to problems created by competing economic 
and social pressures associated with the development of new technologies.’ 
28 See Jane Ginsburg, ‘How Copyright Got a Bad Name for Itself’ (2002) 26(1) Columbia Journal 
of Law & the Arts 61. See also Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons 
in a Connected World (Random House, 2001); Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and 
Copywrongs: The Rise of Intellectual Property and how it Threatens Creativity (New York 
University Press, 2001); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright’s Paradox (Oxford University 
Press, 2008).  
29 Ginsburg, above n 28.   
30 See John Newman, ‘Holden Caulfield Grows Up: Salinger v Colting, the Promotion-of-
Progress Requirement, and Market Failure in a Derivative-Works Regime’ (2011) 96 Iowa Law 
Review 737; Anthony Reese, ‘Transformativeness and the Derivative Work Right’ (2008) 31 
Columbia Journal of Law and Arts 467; Rebecca Tushnet, ‘User-Generated Discontent: 
Transformation in Practice’ (2008) 31 Columbia Journal of Law and Arts 497; Brigitte Gladis, 
‘District Courts, Fair Use, and Literary Parodies: Parsing the Beautiful, Reciprocal 
Arrangement’ (2011) 41 Seton Hall Law Review 1169. 
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copyright.31 Instead, there must be particular defined contexts wherein free 
speech values are privileged over copyright. Arguably, the literary ‘re-write’ or 
‘writing back’ is just such a context. If that point is accepted then the question 
that arises is whether the legal rules that are currently in place appropriately 
serve the primacy of free speech, as embodied by the parodic or satirical novel, 
over copyright protection.  
To begin with, natural rights theory is closely entwined with copyright law.32 
From a natural rights perspective a work that may be protected by copyright 
embodies the personality of the author. As Diderot stated, ‘[w]hat form of 
wealth could belong to a man, if not the work of the mind … the most precious 
part of himself, that will never perish, that will immortalize him’.33 This theory 
also supports a moral entitlement to property rights in creative work owing to 
the efforts of the author. There is an obvious overlap between Locke’s labour 
theory, a protean concept in copyright law, and natural rights in general.34 The 
protection of copyright becomes then a matter of protecting the author’s self. 
This notion of natural rights finds immediate application in the structure of 
copyright laws. Notwithstanding the question of joint authors, the rights that 
accrue to the copyright owner are expressed as individual rights. The copyright 
owner immediately acquires these rights — such as the rights to copy, 
communicate and adapt a work — as soon as the work is created. The most 
obvious expression of natural rights theory in copyright laws are moral rights.35 
These encompass the right to artistic integrity, attribution, and the right not to 
have authorship falsely attributed. 
However, natural rights theory neither fully explains nor powers the existence of 
copyright law. As the laws of duration now vaguely attest, copyright is a 
temporary monopoly. The notion of natural rights must yield to the utilitarian 
bargain theory of copyright. As Leval notes, ‘copyright is not an inevitable, 
divine or natural right that confers on authors the absolute ownership of their 
31 See Note, ‘Gone With the Wind Done Gone: “Re-Writing” and Fair Use’ (2002) 115 Harvard 
Law Review 1193, 1214. 
32 Locke’s labour theory, which is frequently pressed into service in copyright debates, has a 
strong connection to natural rights. See Carys Craig, ‘Locke, Labour and Limiting the Author’s 
Right: A Warning against a Lockean Approach to Copyright Law’ (2002) 28 Queen’s Law 
Journal 1; John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (Awnsham Churchill, 1690).  
33 Denis Diderot, ‘Lettre historique et politique adressée à un magistrat sur le commerce de la 
librairie’ (1763) in Roger Lewinter (ed), Oeuvres complètes (Club Français du Livre, 1970) 
vol 5 331.  
34 Craig, above n 32. See discussion below nn 39–41. 
35 Moral rights has already proven to be a roadblock for remix culture. See Perez v Fernandez 
[2012] FMCA 2. 
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creations. It is designed rather to stimulate activity and progress in the arts for 
the intellectual enrichment of the public’.36 
This begs the questions of why such a monopoly may be temporarily granted 
and whether the monopoly is to be complete and uncontested. The answer again 
lies in the architecture of copyright laws, but also in the founding statutes and 
constitutional clauses that have given rise to modern copyright law. 
As has been well-explained elsewhere, the Statute of Anne 1710 was the first 
copyright statute.37 The Statute of Anne introduced the concepts of the author as 
copyright owner and of a fixed term of protection for copyright works. In its 
own chapeau the Statute illustrates its purpose as being ‘an act for the 
encouragement of learning, by vesting the copies of printed books in the authors 
or purchasers of such copies, during the times therein mentioned’. Similarly, the 
Copyright Clause of the Constitution of the United States provides that 
Congress shall have the power ‘to promote the progress of science and useful 
arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to 
their respective writings and discoveries’.38 While the United States Copyright 
Clause is not reflected in the bare grant of power that sits in the Australian 
Constitution there is an undoubted consonance between the two constitutions 
and, in the main, the national approaches to copyright law.  
More pertinently there is a strong utilitarian bent that runs through copyright 
law. Some concept of the social good, no matter that it is poorly defined or 
inadequately expressed, forms part of the rationale for providing copyright 
protection in the first place. In this sense copyright is a reciprocal bargain 
between the author and the public.39 While there have been attempts by 
copyright stakeholders to recast the bargain as simply a vesting of private 
property rights in copyright owners,40 the courts in both the United States and 
36 Pierre Leval, ‘Toward a Fair Use Standard’ (1990) 103 Harvard Law Review 1105, 1107. See 
Harper & Row, 471 US 539, 545–6 (1985).  
37 Dianne Zimmerman, ‘The Statute of Anne and its Progeny: Variations Without a Theme’ 
(2010) 47 Houston Law Review 965. See also Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical 
Perspective (Vanderbilt University Press, 1968); Lyman Patterson, ‘The Statute of Anne: 
Copyright Misconstrued’ (1966) 3 Harvard Journal on Legislation 223. 
38 United States Constitution art 1 § 8 cl 8. 
39 See Fogerty v Fantasy Inc, 510 US 517, 526 (1994) (‘Fogerty’); Sony Corporation of America 
v Universal City Studios, Inc, 464 US 417, 429 (1984) (‘Sony’). In Fogerty, the Supreme Court, 
citing Sony, stated at 526: ‘We have often recognized the monopoly privileges that Congress has 
authorized, while “intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the 
provision of a special reward,” are limited in nature and must ultimately serve the public good.’ 
40 This has often taken the form of using the rhetoric of ‘theft’ or ‘piracy’. See Neil Netanel, ‘Why 
has Copyright Expanded? Analysis and Critique’ in Fiona Macmillan (ed), New Directions in 
Copyright Law (Edward Elgar, 2008) vol 6, 3, 11–2. 
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Australia have been resolute in pointing out that protection is offered in 
exchange for the production of creative works.41 This bargain is best expressed 
by Reed J in Mazer v Stein:42 
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant 
patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual 
effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the 
talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts. Sacrificial days 
devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards commensurate with the 
services rendered. 
This comment speaks to both the utilitarian and labour theories of copyright 
law. Put simply, the best way to maximise society’s welfare is to encourage and 
reward authors for producing creative works.43 The flaw in this theory, which 
Lessig identifies in his text on Remix culture, is that it pre-supposes a clear 
divide between the creative classes and the non-creative classes.44 Presumably, 
the former are the entitled owners of copyright and the latter are the non-
creative consumers of copyright works.  
Lessig argues that this divide is untenable. Indeed, the emergence of remix 
culture has amply illustrated that the barrier between the creative classes and the 
audience is not so much sheer as infinitely permeable.45 There is quite evidently 
a whole new genre of user-generated content that has sprung up around sites 
such as YouTube, Flickr, MySpace and Facebook.  
The emergence of the culture of user-generated content places pressure upon the 
utilitarian ideal in copyright law. If utilitarianism supports the limited protection 
of copyright so as to maximise the production of creative works, why should 
41 See the Supreme Court’s decisions in Fogerty, 510 US 517, 526 (1994) and Sony, 464 US 417, 
429 (1984). In Australia, the High Court has stated in IceTV Pty Ltd v Nine Network Australia 
(2009) 239 CLR 458, 464 (‘IceTV’): ‘Copyright legislation strikes a balance of competing 
interests and competing policy considerations. Relevantly, it is concerned with rewarding 
authors of original literary works with commercial benefits having regard to the fact that literary 
works in turn benefit the reading public.’  
42 347 US 201, 219 (1954) (Reed J). 
43 See William Fisher, ‘Theories of Intellectual Property’ in Stephen R Munzer (ed), New Essays 
in the Legal and Political Theory of Property (Cambridge University Press, 2001) 168 
<http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/iptheory.pdf>. See also William Landes and 
Richard Posner, ‘An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law’ (1989) 18 Journal of Legal Studies 
325. 
44 Lawrence Lessig, Remix: Making Art and Commerce Thrive in the Hybrid Economy (Penguin 
Press, 2008).  
45 See Daniel Gervais, ‘The Tangled Web of UGC: Making Copyright Sense of User-Generated 
Content’ (2009) 11(4) Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law 841. Also, 
Anupam Chander and Madhavi Sunder, ‘Everyone’s a Superhero: A Cultural Theory of “Mary 
Sue” Fan Fiction as Fair Use’ (2007) 95 California Law Review 597. 
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copyright protection be near maximalist when less protection will produce more 
works and encourage higher levels of access? The rationale underpinning the 
bargain has begun to fade. To persevere with strong copyright laws seems 
tenable then if one accepts the labour theory as providing a strong basis for 
protection. Yet, while Locke’s labour theory has never met with sustained 
opposition, there has been a judicial retreat from the labour theory as the basis 
for copyright. In Feist v Rural46 the Supreme Court of the United States 
abandoned the labour theory of copyright by rejecting the sweat of the brow 
doctrine. Similarly, in the IceTV case, the High Court of Australia gave tepid 
support, if that, to the labour theory.47  
What we now lack is a theory that supports strong copyright protection in a 
society where users generate content themselves. The theories that have 
developed over centuries, often at times where writers were part of a privileged 
or well patronised class, are now less applicable in a more democratic sphere. 
Both the natural rights theory and even Locke’s labour theory lack a firm basis 
in modern copyright law. Moreover, while it is clear that utilitarianism supports 
copyright protection it does so on the basis that protection results in more 
creative works. Yet, technology has inverted this paradigm. As SunTrust 
indicates, copyright protection may lead to less creative works. That is, if 
SunTrust had succeeded in its claim against Houghton Mifflin, Randall’s novel 
would not have been published. Further, SunTrust used its copyright rights to 
serve as the legal muscle behind the licensing of derivative rights to authors 
who would write a sequel to GWTW. This led to the rather unsavoury request, 
recounted before the 11th Circuit in SunTrust that a potential author not write a 
sequel that included ‘miscegenation’ and homosexuality.48 The author who 
would have written the sequel regarded the request as repugnant. No further 
creative work was forthcoming in that instance.  
Having stated the basic inquiry of this essay in the Introduction it is helpful to 
revisit it at this point. In effect, some novels, which broadly be characterised as 
parodic or satirical, must copy substantial parts of other works in order to make 
their particular point. The existence of these novels, or even shorter pieces of 
work, is likely to be more prevalent in an environment where getting published 
is significantly easier. These works represent a substantial addition to the 
46 Feist Publications Inc v Rural Telephone Service Co, 499 US 340 (1991). The Supreme Court’s 
rejection of the sweat of the brow doctrine was based on the view that the doctrine flouted 
established rules of copyright by supporting proprietary rights for non-copyrightable materials 
such as facts. 
47 IceTV (2009) 239 CLR 458. 
48 I take it as self-evident that the use of the dated term ‘miscegenation’ is in itself repugnant. The 
aversion to homosexuality should warrant similar censure. Nonetheless, copyright law is not 
concerned with prejudices or philosophies of copyright owners.  
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common stock of culture, but they also represent a challenge to the original 
author’s economic and artistic interests. Herein lies the problem: as a society we 
are well served by an expanding and dynamic literary and artistic culture but the 
legal architecture within which this culture has thrived has firmly entrenched 
rules of copyright law which strongly favour original authors over derivative 
creators.49  
We might be well served then to step away from the theoretical and doctrinal 
concerns of copyright law and to examine our nascent policy problem from a 
different perspective. It is useful to consider the question of the literary re-write 
from within the context of free speech and self-expression. Indeed, while the 
literary re-write might be an issue of copyright infringement, it is also an issue 
of freedom of expression. In particular, it is well worth making the point that the 
type of copyright infringement that we are dealing with here is not simple 
plagiarism or an attempt to take a work without having to pay for it. The 
plagiarist or the surreptitious copier seeks to hide their copying for personal 
gain or profit. As Posner, writing in the context of plagiarism, has noted: 
Concealment is at the heart of plagiarism. But it must be carefully defined. It 
is not a mere failure to acknowledge copying. Often copying is not 
acknowledged because it is known to the intended readership. A parody may 
quote extensively from the work parodied, and always it will copy distinctive 
features of style and theme, yet often without mentioning the parodied work. 
But the parodist will plant clues so numerous and unmistakeable that the 
reader will recognise the copying, for otherwise the parody will not be 
recognised as a parody and the parodist’s intentions will be thwarted.50 
Plagiarism and parody stand in an obvious contradistinction to each other. 
Posner begins his short book on plagiarism by recounting the story of Kaavya 
Viswanathan who wrote the novel How Opal Mehta Got Kissed, Got Wild, and 
Got a Life while still a teenager and a sophomore at Harvard. Perhaps owing to 
her youth and alma mater, the subsequent plagiarism scandal attracted excessive 
notoriety.  In Opal Mehta, Viswanathan had plagiarised passages from several 
authors, including Megan McCafferty, who was a competing author in the 
market for teen fiction and from whom a substantial number of passages were 
taken. Whether the plagiarism was intentional or the product of a photographic 
memory,51 the copying had the effect of using the original author’s work to out-
compete her in the same market.52 While I am mindful of the difference 
49 Netanel, above, n 14 argues that copyright serves established interests of large stakeholders 
over smaller players.  
50 Richard Posner, The Little Book of Plagiarism (Knopf Doubleday, 2007) 17–18.  
51 Ibid 5. 
52 Posner noted that Viswanathan’s changes improved on McCafferty’s prose, but in doing so 
‘used her own words against her’ in the ‘chick-lit’ market: Ibid 70. 
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between plagiarism and copyright, the use of one author’s work to capture their 
market strikes at the heart of copyright law. 
Yet, parody is fundamentally different. As the Supreme Court noted in 
Campbell53 a parody might suppress demand for the original via a withering 
critique, but this is a different thing to coveting the original’s market through 
mimicry. The parodic or satirical novel involves copying that makes a social or 
political point or argument. In other words, the satirical novel is a speech act. 
The protection of this type of novel demonstrates how greatly we value free 
speech.  
This was a live issue during the SunTrust litigation. In the United States the 
First Amendment explicitly protects freedom of expression. The 11th Circuit 
acknowledged that copyright could be used to limit free speech and found that it 
was inappropriate in the SunTrust case. When this issue had arisen previously in 
American jurisprudence, courts had expressed the view that copyright’s internal 
safety valves, such as fair use and the idea/expression dichotomy ensured 
copyright’s consistency with the First Amendment. These obiter remarks in 
Harper & Row drew upon the famous paper on copyright and the First 
Amendment by Melville Nimmer.54 In that paper Nimmer argued that the 
internal requirements of copyright law protected it from First Amendment 
scrutiny by providing sufficient safety valves for free expression. However, 
Netanal pointed out that Nimmer’s appraisal of the relationship between 
copyright and the First Amendment was written well before the lengthy 
extension of duration, the rise of ‘para-copyrights’, and the general 
strengthening of copyright law.55 Accordingly, at least in the United States, 
constitutional issues might be relevant in cases where parodic novels are 
disputed.  
The extent to which the values of free speech find application in the doctrines 
and statutes of Australian law is a matter of some debate. The most famous 
embodiment of free speech values is the implied freedom of political 
communication.56 Yet, this is a constitutional doctrine whose limits are 
increasingly more apparent and are tied to ss 7 and 24 of the Constitution.57 
53 Campbell, 510 US 569, 590–1 (1994). 
54 Nimmer, above n 16. 
55 Netanel, above n 14. 
56 See Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 104; Nationwide News Pty 
Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1; Australian Capital Television v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 
106. 
57 Australian Constitution ss 7, 24.  See Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 
CLR 520, 567 (‘Lange’) where the High Court stated ‘… two questions must be answered 
before the validity of the law can be determined. First, does the law effectively burden freedom 
of communication about government or political matters either in its terms, operation or effect? 
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There are limits to free speech in the form of the racial hatred provisions of the 
Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) and the inciting violence provisions of the 
Criminal Code.58 It is notable that a clear relationship between free speech and 
the proscription of racial hatred exists in pt IIA of the Racial Discrimination 
Act.59 That is, ss 18C and 18D set out a test of proportionality for balancing one 
against the other. Similarly, in Lange60 and other cases, the High Court has 
developed and refined a test of proportionality for balancing the restraint on 
legislative power contained in the implied freedom of communication against 
the desired policy goal of the legislature. In both instances the proportionality 
test involving free speech and some other legislative end is clearly set out. 
 What is lacking in the Copyright Act is any clear legal rule that imposes free 
speech on Australian copyright law. Australia lacks the First Amendment which 
the United States enjoys. There is no great Antipodean counterpoint on a 
constitutional level to the restriction on speech presented by copyright law. The 
implied freedom only has operation with respect of legislative action, but it does 
not apply against private actors.61 Moreover, in the one case where free speech 
values were arguably considered in Australian copyright law, Commonwealth v 
John Fairfax & Sons,62 the question of free speech was not explicitly addressed. 
Nonetheless, the John Fairfax case, which involved an argument of fair dealing 
with regard to the unauthorised publication of government documents, does 
Second, if the law effectively burdens that freedom, is the law reasonably appropriate and 
adapted to serve a legitimate end the fulfilment of which is compatible with the maintenance of 
the constitutionally prescribed system of representative and responsible government.’ 
58 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 11.4. 
59 See Toben v Jones (2003) 199 ALR 1; Jones v Scully (2002) 120 FCR 243; Eatock v Bolt 
[2011] FCA 1103 (‘Bolt’). In Bolt, Bromberg J, commenting on pt IIA of the Racial 
Discrimination Act and racial vilification, stated at [6]: ‘Section 18D exempts from being 
unlawful, conduct which has been done reasonably and in good faith for particular specified 
purposes, including the making of a fair comment in a newspaper. It is a provision which, 
broadly speaking, seeks to balance the objectives of s 18C with the need to protect justifiable 
freedom of expression.’  
60 (1997) 189 CLR 520. 
61 Melissa De Zwart, ‘The Future of Fair Dealing in Australia: Protecting Freedom of 
Communication’ (2007) 4(1) Script-Ed 96, 110. 
62 (1980) 147 CLR 39 (‘John Fairfax’). In this case, two former employees of the Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade attempted to publish a book about East Timor. The book contained 
departmental documents which were produced without authorisation. The case was primarily a 
breach of confidence matter, but copyright defences relating to fair dealing and the public 
interest defence were raised. The Commonwealth succeeded in its copyright claim. In his major 
work on free speech, Chesterman has argued that John Fairfax was a copyright case that 
recognised free speech even though this was not explicitly stated. See Michael Chesterman, 
Freedom of Speech in Australia: A Delicate Plant (Ashgate, 2000) 7. 
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suggest that fair dealing plays a similar role in protecting free speech values 
under Australian law as it does under American law.63 Mason J stated: 
However, there is another possible approach to the concept of ‘fair dealing’ as 
applied to copyright in government documents, an approach which was not 
spelled out in argument by the defendants. It is to say that a dealing with 
unpublished works which would be unfair as against an author who is a 
private individual may nevertheless be considered fair as against a 
government merely because that dealing promotes public knowledge and 
public discussion of government action. This would be to adopt a new 
approach to the construction of ss 41 and 42 and it would not be appropriate 
for me on an interlocutory application to proceed on the footing that it is a 
construction that will ultimately prevail. Situations such as the present case 
would scarcely have been within the contemplation of the draftsman when the 
two sections and their ancestors were introduced.64 
It is perhaps quite helpful that in legal policy we are not confined by the rigid 
application of doctrinal rules, one between the other, as we would be in the 
realm of black letter law. Moreover, what Netanel’s analysis proves is that the 
harmony that might once have existed between the values of free speech and the 
rules of copyright law has been disturbed by the expansion of the latter.65 This 
does not need to be addressed purely as a doctrinal or constitutional matter. 
Though there is little jurisprudence in Australia regarding the tensions between 
free speech and copyright law there is a general acceptance of free speech as an 
important part of a liberal democracy. This has been expressed politically and 
judicially. Further, it stands to reason that in a liberal democratic state such as 
Australia, copyright must have some relationship to free speech. Why else then 
would there be fair dealing exceptions for reporting the news, criticism and 
review and now parody or satire? These internal requirements would operate in 
a similar way that fair use is meant to operate in the United States in 
maintaining a balance with free speech. There is scope for considering how the 
values of free speech can inform the future development of Australian copyright 
law.  
There are three justifications put forward for free speech: the search for truth, 
autonomy and democracy. The basis for the search for the truth argument is that 
if speech is truly free then the truth can be discovered in an unrestrained 
discourse. Similarly, the autonomy argument ties free speech to personal 
63 De Zwart has traced the development of the fair dealing laws and has identified that at their 
genesis some judicial consideration was given to freedom of expression. See Melissa De Zwart, 
‘A Historical Analysis of the Birth of Fair Dealing and Fair Use: Lessons for the Digital Age’ 
(2007) 1 Intellectual Property Quarterly 60, 63. 
64 John Fairfax (1980) 147 CLR 39, 50 [45].  
65 Netanel, above n 14. 
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liberty.66 A free human being should have the autonomy to express themselves 
as they choose. In this sense, freedom of expression is tied to personhood and 
autonomy. The democracy argument in free speech is best illustrated by Oliver 
Wendell Holmes’ concept of the marketplace of ideas.67 Holmes’ argument is 
that free speech allows an idea to get itself accepted in a market filled with 
competing ideas.  
These arguments in favour of free speech have immediate application in the 
context of Randall and Colting’s novels. It is undeniably clear that there is a 
broader political purpose behind Randall’s novel. TWDG challenges the 
sanitised view of slavery presented by Mitchell’s GWTW. In this sense TWDG 
is a literary embodiment of the search for the truth. It is a riposte to the 
falsehood that might be said to exist in Mitchell’s novel. Moreover, in order to 
expose that falsehood, and to locate it perfectly in Mitchell’s novel, Randall had 
to take a substantial part of the original novel.  
Given that free speech is often tightly linked to political matters and the 
functioning of democracy, Randall’s novel, which deals with the hot button 
issue of race, is easier to tie in with the arguments in favour of free speech. The 
task is somewhat more difficult with respect to Colting’s 60YL. There is no 
underlying ‘political’ message in 60YL; rather, the novel is an examination of 
the author’s relationship with a character that he created.  
Whether that should deny Colting protection under the banner of free speech is 
less clear. On a theoretical level there is no great stipulation that only political 
speech should be free and that any other type of speech is less deserving of 
protection. Yet, on a doctrinal level, First Amendment jurisprudence is replete 
with instances of fulsome protection being given to political speech, no matter 
how objectionable, whereas less protection is given to commercial speech. 
Despite its commercial nature, 60YL might be regarded as an example of 
artistic expression, albeit one that draws heavily on a pre-existing source.  
From the foregoing discussion, four useful propositions can be developed. First, 
the theoretical basis that underpins copyright protection is largely that of 
utilitarianism. At its heart this theory supports copyright protection in pursuit of 
the greater good in terms of the maximising the production of creative works. 
Secondly, the utilitarian basis of copyright protection is now faltering in the 
remix era as users have proved themselves incredibly adept at creating 
derivative works. These works are well and truly a step beyond mere plagiarism 
and they represent genuine derivative creativity. Thirdly, satire is a part of this 
derivative creativity and a part of free speech. Fourthly, free speech and 
66 See Lee Bollinger, ‘Free Speech and Intellectual Values’ (1983) 92 Yale Law Journal 438. 
67 Abrahams v United States, 250 US 616, 630 (1919). 
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copyright law need a relationship wherein one can be weighed and balanced 
against the other as circumstances require. In other contexts the proportionality 
test that pits free speech against countervailing considerations, such as 
restrictions on harmful racist speech, is more clearly articulated. However, 
copyright has never denied a relationship to free speech. The problem has been 
that the relationship has never really been clearly addressed and articulated.  
Weighing these propositions together seems to lead to the inevitable conclusion 
that a rule must be created. However, such a conclusion might be premature. 
The next step is to consider whether the existing rule that sits in place within 
copyright law, namely, fair use, adequately serves the task of balancing free 
speech against copyright protection. If so, might it perform that task better than 
Australia’s current fair dealing exceptions?  
III THE LIMITS OF FAIR USE? 
Fair use can hardly be regarded as a doctrine with certain and defined 
boundaries. In Dellar v Samuel Goldwyn Inc,68 the 2nd Circuit referred to the 
doctrine as ‘the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright’.69 Lessig has 
referred to fair use as ‘the right to hire a lawyer’.70 Numerous scholars and 
courts have criticised the seemingly enigmatic doctrine.71 There are good 
reasons for these criticisms. It was by no means clear that the Supreme Court 
would adopt Judge Leval’s proposal that fair use should embrace transformative 
use.72 Yet, it did so in the seminal case of Campbell and in doing so set the basis 
for parody and transformative use to become organising principles within fair 
use jurisprudence. In Campbell, the rap band 2-Live Crew had copied and 
parodied Roy Orbison’s song Oh, Pretty Woman. Where Orbison’s lyrics had 
been naïve and romantic, 2-Live Crew’s lyrics contained base humour and 
crudeness.  
68 104 F 2d 661 (2nd Cir, 1939) (‘Dellar’).  
69 Ibid 662.  
70 Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture: How Big Media Uses Technology and the Law to Lock Down 
Culture and Control Creativity (Penguin Books, 2004) 187. 
71 See William Fisher III, ‘Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine’ (1988) 101 Harvard Law 
Review 1659; Gordon, above n 14; Leval, above n 36; Jessica Litman, ‘Billowing White Goo’ 
(2008) 31 Columbia Journal of Law and Arts 587. See also Princeton University Press v 
Michigan Document Services Inc, 99 F 3d 1381, 1392 (6th Cir, 1996) where Nelson J stated: 
‘Fair use is one of the most unsettled areas of the law. The doctrine has been said to be ‘so 
flexible as virtually to defy definition”’. 
72 See Leval, above n 36. 
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There are four factors to be considered in any fair use analysis. Section 107 of 
the United States Copyright Act provides that a use of a copyright protected 
work may be a fair use depending upon: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;  
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;  
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and  
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work. 
The four-factor test must be applied on a case by case basis and no ‘bright line’ 
rule exists for determining whether an impugned use is a fair use.73 The purpose 
of fair use is in fact to allow a flexible approach to deciding whether a free use 
exception applies. In enacting § 107 of the Copyright Act, Congress had merely 
sought to restate the judicially created doctrine of fair use rather than to alter it. 
Fundamentally, the inquiry is concerned with whether the use of the original 
copyright protected work is fair. As Leval has noted, despite oft-repeated 
references to fair use as an equitable rule of reason, the doctrine has no basis in 
equity and is instead a creature of the courts of the common law.74 Accordingly, 
the motives of the secondary user are generally of less relevance and it is the 
characterisation of the overall use as fair or unfair that is of paramount concern. 
In principle, each of the four factors is to be given weight. In practice, two 
factors, the first, which deals with the purpose and character of the use, and the 
fourth, which concerns the effect on the market for the original work, have 
emerged as the two leading considerations in fair use cases.75  
The first and fourth factors embody two different approaches to fair use. The 
first factor sets the basis for the transformative use approach to fair use. The 
fourth factor underpins the market failure approach to fair use.  
In Campbell, the Supreme Court identified the primary enquiry under the first 
factor as being whether the second work merely superseded the original or 
whether it added something new. Justice Souter, delivering the opinion of the 
Court, explicitly endorsed Leval’s treatment of transformative works. Further, 
73 Campbell, 510 US 569, 577 (1994). 
74 Leval, above n 36, 1127. 
75 Barton Beebe, ‘An Empirical Study of US Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978-2005’ (2008) 
156 University of Philadelphia Law Review 549, 582–6. See also Neil Netanel, ‘Making Sense 
of Fair Use’ (2011) 15(3) Lewis & Clark Law Review 715. 
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Souter J held that ‘the more transformative the new work, the less will be the 
significance of other factors, like commercialism’.76 His Honour also noted that 
parody had ‘an obvious claim to transformative value’.77  
Souter J noted with regard to the second factor that creative works were closer 
to the core of copyright. However, he held that this was of little assistance in 
parody cases given the need for parodies to copy heavily from the original work. 
Souter J stated that the creative nature of the original work did not ‘help much 
in separating the fair use sheep from the infringing goats in a parody case, since 
parodies almost invariably copy publicly known, expressive works’.78 In 
relation to the third factor the Court recognised the need for the parody to 
conjure up the original. Souter J stated: 
Parody’s humor, or in any event its comment, necessarily springs from 
recognizable allusion to its object through distorted imitation. Its art lies in the 
tension between a known original and its parodic twin. When parody takes 
aim at a particular original work, the parody must be able to ‘conjure up’ at 
least enough of that original to make the object of its critical wit 
recognizable.79 
The Supreme Court did not define the scope of the test for ‘conjuring up’ the 
original work. The Court noted that it was appropriate for a parody to take the 
heart of the original so as to conjure up the earlier work.80 However, the 
Supreme Court remanded to the Court of Appeal the question of whether 2-Live 
Crew had taken an excessive amount of the original.81 With regard to the fourth 
factor the Supreme Court held that the commerciality of the parody did not 
necessarily entail a finding of market harm.82 Moreover, while the parody might 
harm the market for the original through its critique, that will not amount to 
unfair use because it does not equate to supplanting the original in its own 
market through substitution.83 The Court stated ‘there is no protectable 
derivative market for criticism. The market for potential derivative uses includes 
only those that creators of original works would in general develop or license 
others to develop’.84  
76 Campbell, 510 US 569, 579 (1994). 
77 Ibid.  
78 Ibid 586. 
79 Ibid 588. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid 589. 
82 Ibid 591. 
83 Ibid 591–2. 
84 Ibid. 
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The significance of Campbell is hard to overstate. In deciding that 2-Live 
Crew’s use of Orbison’s song was fair use because it was both transformative 
and a parody, the Supreme Court steered fair use away from the market failure 
theory of fair use and into waters that favoured a broader approach to free 
speech. In this sense, Campbell was the counterpoint to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Sony. Where Sony had favoured fair use on the basis that time-
shifting was not competing with the market, thereby buying in to the market 
failure theory of fair use, the primacy of parody and transformative use in 
Campbell85 recognised the need for writers to use the works of other writers in 
order to make particular points.  
It seems easy to conclude that fair use jurisprudence in the United States 
swapped one set of organising principles, market failure, for another set, parody 
and transformative use, in the 1990s. To some extent this is true. After the 
Campbell decision there were a number of cases that tried to call on 
transformative use in order to evade copyright infringement claims. Yet, at the 
same time there were cases that tried to call on the market failure theory, mainly 
as the defendants pedalled infringing products that targeted a gap in the 
market.86  
The better picture of the situation is that fair use’s voluminous jurisprudence 
comprises clusters of which the parody cases are but one such cluster.87 
Overlaying the clusters are the two different theoretical approaches to fair use: 
transformative use and market failure. They are quite different, but are not 
diametrically opposed to each other. For example, the transformative use 
approach to fair use which supports parody can also call upon market failure 
because there is often no market for licences from the owner of an original 
copyright work for parodies of their work. 
Samuelson has studied fair use cases and has proffered five different clusters of 
cases based upon use: (1) ‘free speech and expression fair uses’; (2) ‘authorship 
promoting fair uses’; (3) ‘uses that promote learning’; (4) ‘foreseeable uses of 
copyright’ other than those stated in the chapeau of § 107  (these include 
personal uses, litigation uses and government uses); and (5) ‘unforeseen uses’ 
(these broadly refer to new uses created by new technologies).88 Literary re-
writes which might be fair uses can be located within this taxonomy of uses as 
free speech and expression fair uses.  
85 Campbell, 510 US 569, 579 (1994). 
86 See A&M Records Inc v Napster Inc, 239 F 3d 1004 (9th Cir, 2001). 
87 See Beebe, above n 75; Samuelson, below n 88. 
88 Pamela Samuelson, ‘Unbundling Fair Uses’ (2009) 77 Fordham Law Review 2537, 2544–6. 
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In the cluster of cases that Samuelson identifies it is clear that fair use can 
promote the purposes of free speech. For example, in Nordstrom Inc v 
PARAN,89 fair use permitted the distribution of a store’s advertisement in a 
leaflet with accompanying text pointing out why it was racist. In cases like 
Nordstrom, it was clear that copyright was being used to suppress speech that 
was critical of the copyright owner or which would reveal undesirable 
behaviours or facts. Samuelson put forward parodies as being examples of ‘new 
works that criticize, comment upon, or offer new insights about … the social 
significance of others’ expressions’.90 In this sense the parody cases stand quite 
apart from the more blatantly political cases. In a slightly discordant note in an 
otherwise exceptional piece, Samuelson characterised SunTrust as an example 
of a ‘nonparodic transformative critique’ of an earlier work.91 However, it is 
clear from SunTrust that the 11th Circuit regarded TWDG as a parody. The 
broader point that Samuelson makes is that parody is not the only form of 
transformative adaptation. Indeed, in Blanch v Koons92 the use of an earlier 
work in a piece of transformative artistic expression was found to be fair use.  
A The Wind Done Gone as Fair Use 
Alice Randall’s TWDG was published in 2001 by Houghton Mifflin. TWDG 
takes direct issue with the sympathetic treatment of slavery and Southern racism 
in Mitchell’s GWTW. Where GWTW had effectively airbrushed the reality of 
slavery, TWDG exposed the inhumanity of slavery and the pervasiveness of 
racism in the South. TWDG begins by telling GWTW from the perspective of a 
slave called Cynara. In doing so, TWDG takes heavily from GWTW in order to 
re-tell the romance between Rhett and Scarlett and the reality of the South. That 
said, TWDG goes further than GWTW and contains parts that are clearly 
original.  
Mitchell’s estate argued that TWDG constituted an infringement of her 
copyright. Houghton Mifflin argued that TWDG was a fair use parody of 
GWTW. Mitchell’s estate succeeded before the District Court and gained an 
injunction against the publication of Randall’s novel. However, this was 
overturned by the 11th Circuit.93  
The similarities between TWDG and GWTW are extensive. Quite apart from 
the title, ‘The Wind Done Gone’ being a clever if obvious play on the original 
89 No 92-1349, 1992 US Dist LEXIS 9162 (DDC, 26 June 1992). 
90 Samuelson, above n 88, 2548–9. 
91 Samuelson, above n 88, 2551. 
92 467 F 3d 244 (2nd Cir, 2006). 
93 SunTrust, 268 F 3d 1257 (11th Cir, 2001).  
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work, TWDG takes quite a lot from GWTW. There are similarities in the 
opening passages; GWTW begins: ‘Scarlett O’Hara was not beautiful, but men 
seldom realized it when caught by her charm as the Tarleton twins were ...’ 
whereas in TWDG Randall writes, ‘She was not beautiful, but men seldom 
recognized this, caught up in the cloud of commotion and scent in which she 
moved.’94 Similarly, TWDG takes characters, plot twists and settings from 
GWTW. However, the takings are not simply acts of blanket copying and a 
subversive purpose is evident in many instances. For example, Scarlett O’Hara 
becomes ‘Other’; Rhett Butler becomes ‘RB’ or ‘Debt Chaffeur’; Melanie 
becomes ‘Mealy Mouth’; Tara becomes ‘Tata’ and Twelve Oaks Plantation 
becomes ‘Twelve Slaves Strong As Trees’.95 Similarly, key scenes from 
GWTW are re-told from a slave’s perspective. In fact, the slaves are portrayed 
as more intelligent than their vacuous white owners. In GWTW, Gerald wins 
Pork, his slave and butler, in a game of cards. In TWDG the scene is inverted so 
that Garlic (Pork) engineers the card game and the transfer from one owner to 
another. In TWDG, Cynara is the half-sister of Scarlett and she too marries 
Rhett Butler.96 However, TWDG is uniquely told from Cynara’s perspective 
and continual dismissal of Scarlett as ‘Other’ mimics the ‘othering’ of minority 
races. 
The District Court rejected Houghton Mifflin’s fair use argument. Judge Pannell 
found that Randall’s novel amounted to no more than a sequel to GWTW.97 
Judge Pannell’s approach to the issue of transformative use is rather puzzling. 
On the one hand he acknowledged that Randall adds new historical elements to 
GWTW by including the realities of slavery in TWDG.98 On the other hand, he 
characterised the re-write as simply being that the ‘author takes Cynara on new 
adventures with the older work’s characters’.99 Judge Pannell never seemed to 
address how TWDG could be construed as transformative. Instead, he 
acknowledged that it contained some transformative elements, but that held that 
these elements were no greater than would be found in a sequel.100 Judge 
Pannell also found against TWDG on the second and third fair use factors.101 
Having found TWDG to be little more than a sequel, Pannell J then found that it 
amounted to market substitution in relation to the fourth fair use factor.102  
94 SunTrust, 136 F Supp 2d 1357, 1369 (ND Ga, 2001). 
95 SunTrust, 268 F 3d 1257, 1267 (11th Cir, 2001). 
96 Ibid 1271. 
97 SunTrust, 136 F Supp 2d 1357, 1378 (ND Ga, 2001). 
98 Ibid 1375. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid 1377. 
101 Ibid 1379–82. 
102 Ibid 1382. 
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The 11th Circuit reversed the District Court’s judgment. The 11th Circuit found 
that TWDG constituted a fair use of GWTW.103 The Court identified the 
commerciality of the infringing work and its transformative nature as being the 
two most pertinent factors in relation to the first factor in the fair use test. 
However, the Court found that the transformative nature of TWDG greatly 
outweighed the commercial nature of the work.104 As the 11th Circuit noted, ‘[a] 
work’s transformative value is of special import in the realm of parody, since a 
parody’s aim is, by nature, to transform an earlier work’.105 
Judge Birch, delivering the main opinion of the Court, identified the 
transformative nature of TWDG as arising from the unique and different 
perspective that it added to GWTW.106 Judge Birch noted that rather than being 
a mere work of fiction, TWDG constituted a critique and a rebuttal of GWTW 
in the guise of a work of fiction.107 Moreover, choosing to present her criticism 
in the form of a work of fiction arguably gave Randall a much wider audience 
than any academic commentary could ever have hoped to achieve. The Court 
noted the racism inherent in GWTW. Mitchell’s narration and use of characters 
voiced racist sentiments. In GWTW, Scarlett states, ‘The more I see of 
emancipation the more criminal I think it is. It’s just ruined the darkies’.108 
Mitchell as narrator wrote of the African-Americans freed after the 
Reconstruction as being ‘creatures of small intelligence ... [l]ike monkeys or 
small children turned loose among treasured objects whose value is beyond their 
comprehension, they ran wild — either from perverse pleasure in destruction or 
simply because of their ignorance’.109 
In this context, Randall’s use of characters and plotlines from GWTW was done 
in order to attack the racism of the original work. In TWDG, Randall makes 
‘Other’, the literary counterpart to Scarlett, a person of mixed racial descent. 
Further, RB, Rhett’s counterpart, leaves Other for Cynara. In turn, Cynara 
eventually inherits Tata (Tara in GWTW). Judge Birch noted: 
While told from a different perspective, more critically, the story is 
transformed into a very different tale, albeit much more abbreviated. Cynara’s 
very language is a departure from Mitchell’s original prose; she acts as the 
voice of Randall’s inversion of GWTW. She is the vehicle of parody; she is its 
means — not its end. It is clear within the first fifty pages of Cynara’s 
103 SunTrust, 268 F 3d 1257, 1277 (11th Cir, 2001). 




108 Ibid 1270. 
109 Ibid. 
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fictional diary that Randall’s work flips GWTW’s traditional race roles, 
portrays powerful whites as stupid or feckless, and generally sets out to 
demystify GWTW and strip the romanticism from Mitchell’s specific account 
of this period of our history.110 
Viewed from this perspective the transformative nature of TWDG is undeniable. 
As such, the 11th Circuit easily found that Randall had sought to transform 
Mitchell’s work rather than to relieve herself of the burden of creating a new 
work.111  
Judge Birch effectively dismissed the second fair use factor on the grounds that 
though creative works such as GWTW were entitled to significant protection, 
parodies ‘invariably copy publicly known expressive works’.112 Similarly, in 
relation to the third fair use factor the 11th Circuit noted that a parody must take 
at least enough of the original work to ‘conjure up the original in the minds of 
the readership’.113 
With regard to the fourth fair use factor the 11th Circuit again found in favour of 
Randall and Houghton Mifflin. The Court noted that there was a market for 
sequels to GWTW, but it was plain that TWDG, which addressed 
‘miscegenation’ and homosexuality, did not fit with that market. In sum, 
SunTrust failed to adduce evidence to suggest that TWDG would supplant the 
market for sequels to GWTW.114 Though the scathing parody might have 
suppressed demand for the original through its criticism, it was not involved in 
seeking to acquire the same market through mimicry. 
The decision in SunTrust115 is heartening because it preserves speech that 
challenges prejudice and stereotypes. The Court obviously drew heavily on the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Campbell in making its finding of fair use. There 
are two observations that can be made of SunTrust. First, the close alignment 
between the reasoning of the 11th Circuit and the Campbell Court suggests that a 
somewhat rigid framework for parody cases may be emerging. This should be 
related back to the point that Samuelson made in her study of fair use, that non-
parodic transformative uses can also be fair uses. Not every type of literary re-
write will fit the template created in SunTrust and Campbell, but this should not 
preclude a finding of fair use. Secondly, a finding of fair use was far from a 
certainty. After all, in the District Court, Judge Pannell had looked at the same 
110 Ibid. 
111 Ibid 1271 citing Campbell, 510 US 569, 580 (1994). 
112 Ibid 1271 citing Campbell, 510 US 569, 586 (1994). 
113 Ibid 1272.  
114 Ibid 1275–6. 
115 SunTrust, 268 F 3d 1257, 1277 (11th Cir, 2001). 
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facts and had drawn the conclusion of unfairness and infringement. Fair use 
cannot shake its inherent uncertainty as it needs to be evaluated on a case-by-
case basis. Moreover, our judicial system, replete with its appellate review, only 
adds to that uncertainty. It seems trite to observe that there are no better 
alternatives to our longstanding legal system and uncertainty may well be the 
price to be paid for flexibility.  
B Sixty Years Later and Salinger v Colting 
It is somewhat ironic that in an iconic passage from Catcher in the Rye, the 
narrator recounts being told by his literature teacher that many men before him 
had kept a record of their troubles from which a young and troubled Holden 
Caulfield could learn. The teacher suggested that Holden could one day write 
down his own experiences and referred to it as ‘a beautiful reciprocal 
arrangement’.116 When one considers the utilitarian ideals underpinning 
copyright, then JD Salinger’s travails in copyright law seem a snub to the 
reciprocity embedded in copyright’s rationale.117 The late JD Salinger used his 
copyright to shut down an unauthorised biography and Colting’s novel 60YL.  
Colting wrote 60YL as a sequel to Catcher in the Rye. However, in 60YL, 
Colting portrayed Holden Caulfield, ‘Mr C’ in the novel, as an aged 76-year-old 
roaming around New York City. In 60YL instead of having been set loose from 
a high school, Holden had run away from a retirement home. In 60YL, Colting 
engineers a meeting between Mr C and Salinger himself. The tone, language, 
and many of the characters from 60YL are similar to or are taken from Catcher 
in the Rye.  
Salinger sued to prevent the publication of 60YL. The District Court found that 
60YL was substantially similar to Catcher in the Rye.118 As such there was a 
prima facie case of copyright infringement. In relation to Colting’s fair use 
argument the District Court found that 60YL did not contain sufficient parodic 
elements with regard to Catcher in the Rye.119 Similarly, the District Court held 
that 60YL was not adequately transformative in relation to the original work.120 
116 The exact quote is: ‘Many, many men have been just as troubled morally and spiritually as you 
are right now. Happily, some of them kept records of their troubles. You’ll learn from the — if 
you want to. Just as someday, if you have something to offer, someone will learn something 
from you. It’s a beautiful, reciprocal arrangement. And it isn’t education. It’s history. It’s 
poetry.’ J D Salinger, Catcher in the Rye (Little, Brown and Company, 1951) 246. 
117 See Salinger v Random House Inc, 650 F Supp 413 (SDNY, 1986); Salinger v Random House 
Inc, 811 F 2d 90 (2nd Cir, 1986); Salinger v Random House Inc, 484 US 890 (1987). 
118 Salinger v Colting, 641 F Supp 2d 250, 254 (SDNY, 2009). 
119 Ibid 257–60. 
120 Ibid 261–2. 
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The second and third factors were decided against Colting.121 In relation to the 
fourth factor the District Court found that as a ‘sequel’ to Catcher, 60YL could 
harm the market for an authorised sequel.122 
Colting appealed the District Court’s decision to the United State Court of 
Appeals for the 2nd Circuit. The 2nd Circuit remanded the case to the District 
Court with respect to the issue of the legal standard for injunctions.123 However, 
the 2nd Circuit affirmed the District Court’s ruling on the likely merits of 
Salinger’s copyright claim.124 The District Court’s findings in relation to the 
first factor were pivotal to the 2nd Circuit’s concurrence in Salinger v Colting: 
The District Court in its discussion of fair use focused on the first statutory 
factor: the ‘purpose and character of the use’ … In doing this, the Court found 
that ‘[i]t is simply not credible for Defendant Colting to assert now that his 
primary purpose was to critique Salinger and his persona, while he and his 
agents’ previous statements regarding the book discuss no such critique, and 
in fact reference various other purposes behind the book.’ Such a finding is 
not clear error.125 [Citations omitted] 
There was an obvious disconnect between the statements made by Colting and 
his publisher prior to the commencement of litigation and the arguments that he 
sought to rely on in his defence at trial. Prior to litigation Colting had suggested 
that 60YL was a sequel to Catcher, at trial he argued that the book was a 
commentary on the iconic status of Catcher and the relationship between the 
original author and the character Holden Caulfield. There was some merit to the 
argument run at trial and Colting was able to adduce two literary experts to 
support his claim.126 Nonetheless, it is pertinent that both Courts focused on the 
disjunct between his earlier statements and his defence, as this seemed to bring 
in the notion of ‘unclean hands’, an equitable concept, into the fair use analysis. 
While it was not addressed directly as an issue of ‘unclean hands’ the focus on 
conduct sits at odds with Leval’s point that fair use, though often referred to as 
the ‘equitable doctrine of fair use’, is in fact a common law doctrine.127 As such, 
the question should simply have been whether 60YL as a literary work could 
come within the boundaries of fair use in its own right. This would have 
involved an examination of whether a parodic purpose or transformative use 
121 Ibid 263. 
122 Ibid 267–8. This was despite the fact that Salinger had not written a new work since Catcher in 
the Rye and was unlikely to write a sequel himself or to authorise one.  
123 Salinger v Colting, 607 F 3d 68, 84 (2nd Cir, 2010). 
124 Ibid 83. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Ibid 72. 
127 See Sony, 464 US 417, 448 (1984) where the Supreme Court referred to fair use as an 
‘equitable rule of reason’. 
                                                 
2012 THE NOVEL AS SOCIAL SATIRE: LIMITATIONS OF FAIR USE 451 
 
could have been gleaned from the text of 60YL itself. However, given the 
District Court’s finding that neither parody nor transformative use was 
sufficiently apparent in 60YL, it seems likely that a fair use defence would have 
failed notwithstanding any conjecture as to Colting’s conduct.  
IV CAN FAIR USE WORK? 
Two cases do not make for a substantial sample from which to adjudge the 
relationship between the doctrine of fair use and literary re-writes. Yet, from the 
jurisprudence that we do have three observations may be made. First, fair use 
will favour free speech and literary re-writes if the second work is sufficiently 
transformative. Colting’s main failure in 60YL was that his work was not 
sufficiently transformative. In contrast TWDG was greatly transformative. 
Secondly, fair use can offer little in the way of certainty. This is perhaps a 
structural problem pertaining to the doctrine as questions of fair use must be 
determined on a case by case basis and reasonable minds can disagree on the 
application of the doctrine. Thirdly, fair use offers enough flexibility to allow 
highly transformative works the space to exist as free use exceptions to 
copyright infringement. It is this last observation that makes fair use still a 
somewhat desirable presence in Australian copyright law.  
Australia eschewed fair use when it enacted the Copyright Amendment Act 
2006. The then Attorney-General, Philip Ruddock MP stated in 2007 that fair 
use ‘could cause confusion and uncertainty if introduced here’.128 However, 
when viewed as a doctrine that applies to different clusters of like-cases there 
seems to be less uncertainty in fair use than first appears. Moreover, the doctrine 
is broader in its scope than ss 41A and 103AA of the Copyright Act, and they 
have at least the advantage of a substantial body of jurisprudence from the 
United States. The large amount of US jurisprudence is appealing 
notwithstanding the difficult task of translating that into Australian law, 
particularly in light of a different constitutional context.  
It is beyond the scope of this paper to enquire deeply into the meaning of ss 41A 
and 103AA of the Copyright Act. Suffice to say, it is not impossible that the fair 
dealing provisions of the Australian statute might support literary re-writes. It is 
also premature at this point to advocate any particular rule for adoption into 
Australian law though I would make the point that fair use should not be 
discounted too easily. Nonetheless, there is significant cultural and social value 
in protecting literary re-writes as either fair uses or fair dealings. It is only to our 
disadvantage that we ignore the ‘free use’ interests of secondary authors who 
128 Philip Ruddock, ‘Fair Use and Copyright in Australia’ (2007) 25(2) Communications Law 
Bulletin 4, 6. 
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might offer us creative re-writes of existing works. In allowing copyright to 
push out these authors we are denied the perspective that they may offer.  
I am mindful that my essay here was first presented at Deakin University’s 
Remix Conference and that it must speak in some way to the broader issues 
surrounding remix culture. I think that the fundamental point about remix 
culture and its interaction with copyright law was made by Lessig in his text on 
remix — namely that remix culture has become a way of life for the digital 
natives of Gen Y and the like and that our existing laws either criminalise or 
impose liability upon their creativity. Intuitively, this seems wrong — culture is 
after all a shared experience. And dividing society up into creative classes and 
consuming classes when that rigidity need not exist is unnatural. The re-write 
novel plays into this debate in much the same way. Authors will always build 
upon what came before them. Further, whether that involves commenting on 
racial inequality and prejudice or literary fame and isolation, these re-writings 
offer something invaluable to our broader culture. Moreover, they take more 
effort than a brief YouTube clip. To allow copyright to foreclose or limit the 
space of the re-write novel is also to blur the line between the literary re-write 
and the plagiarist. As stated, this is unfair given that the literary re-write does 
not try and hide its relationship to the original work. To put the matter in free 
speech parlance, the literary re-write is concerned with the search for truth.  
If the space does not currently exist, or, if it is surrounded by too much 
uncertainty, then the proper question would be how might it be effectively 
created? There is one simple way. If fair use is brought into Australian law, and 
this might still happen, then the categories to which it might apply can be 
delineated within the statute itself. Moreover, where the category of free speech 
and transformative critiques are concerned, the statute can be worded so as to 
create a presumption in favour of fair use.  
V CONCLUSION 
Copyright law is a crowded space full of different disputes and policy problems. 
Nevertheless, it is a body of law that sits within a wider legal system that serves 
a liberal democracy. That democracy does have an interest in constructive 
exercises of speech. That interest should have some part to play in copyright 
law. We need to be proactive in developing legal rules that suit the type of 
information culture that we desire. The greatest argument that might be made in 
favour of fair use is that, if it has succeeded in the United States in protecting 
literary re-writes, where that protection was demonstrably deserved, then it 
might play the same role in Australia, notwithstanding the untested nature of the 
recent parody and satire amendments.  
